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Abstract
The study of gender diﬀerences in social preferences has shown mixed
results, preventing economists and other social scientists from drawing
definitive conclusions on this topic. Several original investigations and
experimental reviews have hypothesized that the main reason of this het-
erogeneity of results is the myriad of experimental designs used to study
gender diﬀerences. In this paper we test this hypothesis by making male
and female participants to face two diﬀerent but related experimental
games and two diﬀerent information treatments. Through this 2x2 facto-
rial design, we obtain results in line with some recent papers: women are
sensitive to the design and context of the experiment in ways that men
are not. In addition, we go further providing a well-grounded account on
the importance of the context for female decision-making.
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1 Introduction
After years of economic experiments on gender, we can hardly draw any general
conclusion about gender diﬀerences in social preferences.1 In a recent paper,
Cox and Deck (2006) acknowledge the fact that, although several laboratory
studies have found significant gender diﬀerences, the magnitude and direction
of these diﬀerences are far from being known and explained. Similarly, in an
exhaustive review, Croson and Gneezy (2006) only find support for the claim
that ‘women’s social preferences are more sensitive to subtle cues that are men’s’
(2006: 45). In this sense, it is quite widespread among experimental economists
the idea that there are no objective answers to questions like which is the more
generous sex, the fairer one, etc.
In light of this despairing conclusion, should experimental economists give
up studying gender diﬀerences in social preferences? We think they should
not, as we explain below. However, interpreting gender experiments in a case
by case manner does not help to make sense of the myriad of already existing
experimental results. For this reason, not only this paper aims at integrating
our original results, but also some previous results in a broader interpretative
framework to understand gender diﬀerences in economic decision-making. To
this end, we do not necessarily have to start from scratch, but to consider those
gender diﬀerences in economic experiments that we have more evidence for.
The finding that has generated a larger consensus among behavioral economists
is the diﬀerence between female and male risk preferences. Although the results
obtained in laboratory experiments are mixed, there is enough evidence from the
field suggesting that women are more risk averse than men (Eckel and Grossman
2003). The second diﬀerence behavioral economists agree on is the fact that men
react very diﬀerently than women when facing highly competitive environments.
This hypothesis has recently been supported by studies using adults’ samples
(Gneezy, et al. 2003; Niederle and Vesterlund 2007), and a study using a chil-
dren’s sample (Gneezy and Rusticini 2004). Note that these two findings are
quite consistent with an evolutionary account of sex2 diﬀerences in preferences
1Following Croson and Gneezy (2006), we define gender diﬀerences in social preferences as
the diﬀerent way in which others’ payoﬀs (utilities) enter into the utility functions of men and
women.
2The term “sex” is used here to refer to the biological categorization of the two sexes,
male and female. In contrast, “gender” usually alludes to the social role allocated to each sex
by cultural and social factors —although many people use both terms as synonyms. In this
article, we use gender in a broader sense: to name the relationship between biological sex and
behavior (Udry 1994).
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(Croson and Gneezy 2006).
Contrary to the two aspects already mentioned, the relation between gender
and social preferences is not so clear. Whereas some studies have found gender
diﬀerences in bargaining behavior (Holm 2000; Eckel and Grossman 2001; Sol-
nick 2001), generosity (Selten and Ockenfels 1998; Eckel and Grossman 1998;
Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001; Dickinson and Tiefenthaler 2002; Dufwenberg
and Muren 2006a; 2006b), and reciprocity (Croson and Buchan 1999; Cox and
Deck 2006), others studies have found no gender diﬀerences in some of these as-
pects (Bolton and Katok 1995; Clark and Sefton 2001; Eckel and Wilson 2004a;
2004b). Furthermore, even when gender diﬀerences have been found, there is
no clear picture of their exact meaning.
Only in the last few years a hypothesis encompassing these heterogeneous
results is emerging. According to the review of Croson and Gneezy (2006), and
the original paper of Cox and Deck (2006), women are more sensitive to the
social context of the experiment. This implies that, when facing a strategic
decision, women are more aﬀected than men by the perception of the social
environment. In other works, the contextual appraisal is highly important for
female.
In this paper, we study whether women are more sensitive than men to social
cues contained in economic situations. To this end, we use a 2x2 factorial de-
sign —two diﬀerent but related experimental bargaining games and two diﬀerent
information treatments— to test the reaction of men and women to diﬀerent so-
cial environments. In addition, we elicit beliefs in the four conditions —through
an incentive compatible mechanism— to study not only the higher behavioral
responsiveness of women to changes in the environment, but also the relation
between these behavioral changes and the corresponding beliefs.
Our results provide support for the hypothesis that only female behavior
is influenced by changes in the details of the social environment. In addition,
we find that women are better than men in predicting certain environmental
conditions. Turning to a cognitive, rather than a preference-based, account of
sex diﬀerences in economic behavior, we can shed some light on this controversial
issue.3
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlays the research hypotheses.
3This cognitive turn in the interpretation of gender diﬀerences in decision making is also
present in non-experimental economic investigations. For instance, Langowitz and Minitti
(2007) show that perceptual variables are crucial to understand the entrepreneurial propensity
of women.
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Section 3 describes the experimental design and procedure. Section 4 reports
the experimental results. Section 5 interprets these results in light of relevant
findings from neuropsychology. Section 6 concludes.
2 Research hypotheses
This paper aims at testing experimentally mainly two general hypotheses: (i)
there are no systematic gender diﬀerences in social preferences across diﬀerent
experimental bargaining games4; (ii) when gender diﬀerences are observed in
situations that trigger social preferences, these diﬀerences are related to the
way women and men (cognitively) perceive the economic situation, rather than
to intrinsic motivations.
Departing from these two general statements, we now present our working
hypotheses for the proposers and the responders in the bargaining games that
we are considering. Note that we use two asymmetric bargaining games where
the roles played by the first mover (proposer) and the second mover (responder)
diﬀer considerably. Proposer’s oﬀer depends on his or her beliefs about the
other player’s willingness to accept a given oﬀer. On the contrary, responder
states his or her revealed preference when accepting or rejecting a given oﬀer.
Specific hypotheses for both roles are summarized below.
2.1 Hypotheses for Proposers
1. There are no systematic diﬀerences in the size of the oﬀer between pro-
posals made by men and women across simple bargaining games.
2. There are no systematic diﬀerences in the size of the oﬀer depending on
the responder’s gender across simple bargaining games.
3. Women process more contextual information than men when they make
a decision as proposers in simple bargaining games.
2.2 Hypotheses for Responders
1. There are no systematic gender diﬀerences in the responder’s decision
across simple bargaining games.
4Since previous results are mixed, we have decided to formulate our first and second hy-
potheses in negative terms, i.e., we expect no systematic sex nor gender eﬀect.
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2. There are no systematic gender diﬀerences in the responder’s decision
depending on the proposer’s gender across simple bargaining games.
3. Both female and male decisions as responders are not influenced by con-
textual information.
In the next section, the experimental design to test these hypotheses is pre-
sented.
3 Experimental design and procedure
3.1 General features
For the experiment, 280 undergraduate students were recruited (from diﬀerent
disciplines) at Jena University, using ORSEE 2.0 (Greiner 2004). Eight experi-
mental sessions were conducted, each using a diﬀerent group of 32 participants
(16 women and 16 men). Instructions of the experiment can be found in Ap-
pendix A. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) at the computer laboratory of the Max Planck In-
stitute of Economics (Jena, Germany). Subjects received written instructions,
which were also read aloud by a research assistant to ensure everyone understood
them. No communication between subjects was permitted. Subjects could not
identify which other participant they were interacting with. At the end of every
experimental session, subjects were paid in cash according to their payoﬀ in the
game (plus a show-up fee of 2.5C=).5
The time sequence of every experimental session was as follows: In the main
entrance of the laboratory there were two boxes containing two series of numbers
(odd numbers for men and even numbers for women), and subjects picked them
randomly.6 Subjects were individually asked to pick a piece of paper from their
corresponding gender box, and to sit down in front of the computer displaying
5Two weeks before conducting the real experiment, 32 subjects took part in a pilot session
to test the instructions and the experimental procedure. Although the pilot was conducted
successfully, the introduction of one minor change in the real experiment recommends not
using the results of the pilot in the data analysis. This minor change will be explained below.
6 In the pilot, subjects were aware that one box contained numbers for women and the
other numbers for men. However, in order to minimize the so-called ‘demand eﬀect’, in the
real experiment the boxes’ labels were omitted. This minor change seems to have a relative
eﬀect in subjects’ perception of the experiment. Whereas in the pilot session 12 out of 32
participants (37.5%) guessed the topic of the experiment in a postexperimental questionnaire,
in the real experiment only 40 out of 280 participants (14%) guessed it. We will extend below
on how we overcame the potential demand eﬀect.
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the number they had taken. This procedure allowed us to ensure anonymity and
random allocation of participants to computer terminals, while, at the same
time, obtaining the sort of gender matching we were interested in. In every
session we used the same matching procedure, consisting of four diﬀerent gender
combinations: men interacting with men (MM), men interacting with women
(MF), women interacting with men (FM), and women interacting with women
(FF). After the instructions were read aloud, and research assistants answered
questions privately, the experimental tasks started. In the following, we explain
each phase of the experiment sequentially.
3.2 Socio-demographic questions
As in every experiment interested in studying “gender pairing eﬀects”, the cru-
cial issue of the design is how to communicate the partner’s gender without
inducing a “demand eﬀect”. To accomplish this, we use one of the procedures
used by Holm (2000), consisting in providing the gender information embedded
in a broader description of the co-player. Thus, the first task of the experiment
was filling in three questions in the computer screen:
• Which semester are you in?
• Are you originally from Jena?
• Are you female or male?
The first one was a familiar, but theoretically irrelevant question, aimed to
make more diﬃcult for participants to guess the aim of the experiment. This
information was never conveyed to the partners. On the contrary, the informa-
tion about the partner’s origin was always provided, whereas the information
about the partner’s gender was only provided in the treatment condition, but
not in the control one.
3.3 Gender information
In the instructions we asked participants to check their role in a table located
in the upper-right corner of their computer screen. The table consisted of two
columns (named “you” and “your partner”) and two rows, one indicating their
own and their partner’s role, and one providing the “extra information”. In the
“extra information” row, participants could check the place of origin and the
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gender (treatment condition), or just the place of origin (control condition) of
both participants. The four possible combinations in the treatment condition
were: “male from Jena”, “male not from Jena”, “female from Jena”, and “female
not from Jena”. In the control condition, they could either read “from Jena”
or “not from Jena”.
As stated before, we were specially concerned with not revealing the aim
of the experiment. After having asked participants to guess it in a postexper-
imental questionnaire, we are sure this was not an issue. First, only 14% of
the participants thought that gender was the main topic of the experiment, less
than the proportion of subjects that alluded to other motives, like selfishness,
fairness, or cooperation. Second, the proportion of participants that guessed the
topic of the experiment was almost the same in the treatment and the control
conditions (14.5% vs. 12.5%). We believe that reporting these data is necessary
to avoid the possible confounding eﬀect of gender stereotypes. If the majority of
participants were aware of the theme of the experiment, this could have became
a survey about subjects’ political views, and not a test of the behavioral changes
induced by gender information.
3.4 Game phase
According to a 2x2 between subjects factorial design, diﬀerent participants took
part in four diﬀerent scenarios. In the first four sessions (128 participants), the
subjects played a standard Ultimatum game (Güth et al. 1982) with gender
information (UGT). The fifth session (32 participants) was a control session
(without gender information) for the Ultimatum game (UGC). In the following
three sessions (80 participants), the subjects played a Yes-or-No game (Gehrig
et al., forthcoming) with gender information (YNT). The last session (32 par-
ticipants) was a control session for the Yes-or-No game (YNC). Table 1 lists the
main features of the experiment.
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Table 1: Experimental design
UGT UGC YNT YNC
No of sessions 4 1 37 1
No of participants 128 32 80 32
Date 06/21/07
Game UG UG YNG YNG
Treatment Yes No Yes No
Average earnings 8.29C= 8.08C= 8.73C= 8.73C=
In both games, a proposer (called player X) proposed a way of sharing 100
ECUs (10 ECUs = 1C=) between him or herself and another participant. The
proposer could choose among nine diﬀerent distributions ([10-90], [20-80], [30-
70], [40-60], [50-50], [60-40], [70-30], [80-20], [90-10]). Whether the proposed
distribution was actually earned by participants depended on the decision made
by the responder (called player Y ). If the responder accepted the oﬀer, both
participants got the corresponding number of ECUs, otherwise they got no
payoﬀ in this part of the experiment.
For responders in the Ultimatum game (UG hereafter), the strategy method
(Selten 1967) was used. Every responder had to accept or reject every single
potential oﬀer. Thus, we can obtain the “minimum acceptable oﬀer” (MAO),
i.e., the minimum amount of ECUs that the responder was willing to accept. On
the contrary, responders in the Yes-or-No game (YNG hereafter) had to decide
if they accept or reject the oﬀer before knowing it.8
3.5 Belief elicitation phase
After playing one of the two games just once, every participant was asked to
predict the behavior of his or her partner. Our belief elicitation procedure is
adapted from the one used by Schotter and Sopher (2007),9 and worked as
follows.
In both games, for the responder, we asked what they though the probability
was of receiving every potential oﬀer. Specifically, we asked them to enter a
vector r = (r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9), with
P9
k=1 rk = 100. Responders were
rewarded using a quadratic scoring rule described in Appendix B.
7The third YNT session involved 24 subjects (12 females and 12 males).
8As in the paper of Gehrig et al. (forthcoming), all the responders accepted the oﬀer in
this game.
9This belief elicitation procedure, introduced by Nyarko and Sopher (2002), has been used
successfully in other two studies (Schotter and Sopher 2004; 2006).
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To elicit truthful beliefs from the proposer we use a similar procedure. We
asked the proposer to assign a probability to the acceptance of the oﬀer he or she
actually proposed.10 The proposer typed a single probability of acceptance (πka).
Proposers were rewarded using a quadratic scoring rule described in Appendix
B.
Note that the belief elicitation procedure used is incentive compatible both
for the proposer and for the responder (see Appendix B for a complete expla-
nation). This method provides the best way of eliciting truthful beliefs without
inducing behavioral changes in the participants. In addition, we made sure that
the amount of money that could potentially be earned in the belief elicitation
phase of the experiment was not very large, in order not to induce changes in
the participants’ behavior. In this sense, while the participants could earn a
maximum of 100 ECUs in the game phase, they could only earned 20 ECUs in
the prediction task.
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
In the following, a preliminary analysis of the experimental results is presented.
Mainly we concentrate on the behavioral diﬀerences between men and women
in both roles (proposer and responder). Here the results obtained from the UG
and the YNG are analyzed separately. In the next subsection we pool the data
from both games to perform regression analyses.
4.1.1 Proposers’ behavior
Mean oﬀers by gender pairing in both games are reported in tables 2a (UG) and
2b (YNG). On average, women oﬀer less than men, both in the UG (39.5 vs.
44.25) and in the YNG (27.33 vs. 28.00), although none of these diﬀerences are
statistically significant. Considering the gender of the responder, on average,
men receive lower oﬀers than women, both in the UG (41.87 vs. 45.62) and in
the YNG (26.36 vs. 29.09). Again, these diﬀerences are not significant.
At a first glance, it seems that both the sex of the subjects and their partner’s
gender have no impact in proposer’s behavior. However, when we explore the
10This is true for the UG. In the case of the YNG, the procedure is technically the same
although the probability asked is not the one attached to the actual oﬀer but to the fact of
accepting any oﬀer, since the responder does not know the actual proposal.
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data to test how gender information aﬀects each gender’s behavior, the picture
is somewhat diﬀerent. In both games, women but not men change their behavior
in the treatment condition. Thus, in the UG, when women have information
about their partners’ gender, they oﬀer significantly more than when they do
not have this information (Mann-Whitney U-test: z = −1.966, p = 0.049).
We do not find the same pattern for men (Mann-Whitney U-test: z = −0.428,
p = 0.668). Note that, in this case, gender information induces women to
give more to both genders (indeed, they give on average exactly the same to
both groups). Gender information also induces changes in the female but not
the male proposers’ behavior in the YNG. When having information about the
partner’s gender, women oﬀer significantly more to women than to men (Mann-
Whitney U-test: z = −2.062, p = 0.039). Gender information has no impact
in male proposers’ behavior in the YNG (Mann-Whitney U-test: z = −0.174,
p = 0.862).
Table 2a
Oﬀers by Type of Pair Average and Standard Error in the UG
Responder
Proposer Male Female Sex Unknown Average
Male 41.87 45.62 46.25 44.25
(3.44) (2.41) (6.53) (2.08)
Female 41.25 41.25 32.50 39.5
(2.87) (2.87) (4.53) (1.89)
Average 41.56 43.44 39.38 41.49
(2.20) (1.88) (4.23) (1.42)
Table 2b
Oﬀers by Type of Pair Average and Standard Error in the YNG
Responder
Proposer Male Female Sex Unknown Average
Male 26.36 29.09 28.75 28.00
(5.27) (6.39) (5.81) (3.30)
Female 18.89 33.08 27.50 27.33
(4.55) (4.44) (4.53) (2.79)
Average 23.00 31.25 28.13 27.67
(3.56) (3.73) (3.56) (2.14)
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4.1.2 Responders’ behavior
Since everyone accepts the oﬀer in the YNG, we present the data regarding
the 80 subjects that play the role of responder in the UG. Specifically, table 3
reports the minimum acceptable oﬀer (MAO) stated by every subject, i.e., the
lowest oﬀer that they are willing to accept when asked to accept or reject every
potential oﬀer. Again, there are no general diﬀerences if we consider which gen-
der is willing to accept lower oﬀers. Both genders demand almost the same (men
22.75 vs. women 22.50). Gender pairing has no eﬀect either. Both genders de-
mand slightly more to women than to men (22.81 vs. 21.56), but this diﬀerence
is far from being significant. Only when observing the eﬀect of the treatment,
behavioral gender diﬀerences in responders’ behavior appear. When having in-
formation about the partner’s gender, women demand significantly less than
they do when not having this information (Mann-Whitney U-test: z = −2.33,
p = 0.019). This is not the case for men (Mann-Whitney U-test: z = −0.860,
p = 0.390). Note that this eﬀect in female responders’ behavior is consistent
with the one observed in female proposers in the UG. When women have infor-
mation about their partners’ gender, independently of the exact content of this
information, they behave more sympathetic, i.e., they oﬀer significantly more
and demand significantly less.
Table 3
MAO by Type of Pair Average and Standard Error
Responder
Proposer Male Female Average
Male 23.75 19.38 21.56
(2.86) (3.70) (2.34)
Female 25.00 20.63 22.81
(3.16) (3.22) (2.56)
Sex unknown 16.25 32.50 24.38
(4.20) (3.66) (3.41)
Average 22.75 22.50 22.63
(1.93) (2.20) (1.45)
4.2 Regression analysis
Now we consider our hypotheses. We are interested in studying gender dif-
ferences across games and treatments. To this end, we study proposers’ and
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responders’ behavior using ordered probit regression models and controlling for
all the socio-demographic and treatment variables that we can obtain from our
design (see table 4). Both for proposers and for responders, we present three
diﬀerent regression analyses: one including the complete sample and controlling
for the gender of the player and two separate analyses, one for each gender.
This latter procedure tries to capture our third hypotheses: women and men
make decisions in a (cognitively) diﬀerent way. Table 4 reports the definition of
the variables included in the regression models.
Table 4
Definition of Variables
Variable Definition
Proposal Proposer’s decision
MAO Responder’s minimum acceptable oﬀer
Female 1 if female
YNG 1 if playing the YNG
Treatment 1 if gender information is provided
Experience The semester the subject is attending
City 1 if the subject is not from Jena
City pairing 1 if the partner is not from Jena
Female pairing 1 if the partner is female
Decision time No of seconds needed to make the decision
Prediction time No of seconds needed to make the prediction
Note: Dependent variables in italics.
4.2.1 Proposers’ behavior
Table 5 reports the regression analyses for proposers’ behavior. We study our
first and second hypotheses for proposers looking at the first of the three models
presented. Regarding these hypotheses, our main results are:
Result 1: Female proposers make weakly significant lower oﬀers when control-
ling for other seven socio-demographic and treatment variables.
Result 2: The gender of the responder does not aﬀect significantly the size of
the oﬀer when controlling for other seven socio-demographic and treatment
variables.
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Apart from these two results —directly related to our hypotheses— we find
other two variables that aﬀect significantly the size of the oﬀer. Both variables
behave in an expected way. First, oﬀers are significantly lower in the YNG
than in the UG, what is in line with the findings of Gehrig et al. (forthcom-
ing). Second, students in advanced stages of their degree behave closer to the
game theoretical prediction. This fact could be related to the number of previ-
ous participations in economic experiments. Unfortunately, due to anonymity
conditions, we cannot check if this is the case.
Now we are interested in how men and women face the proposer’s decision.
To this end, we compare the second and third models presented in table 5.
That the social context of the experiment influences females, but not males
proposer’s behavior is clear. Contextual information —whether they have gender
information, the origin of the responder, and the gender of the responder— has a
weekly significant impact on the size of female oﬀers. Women oﬀer more when
they know the partner’s gender, when they know precisely the city of origin of
the responder11, and when they know that the responder is a woman. In the
next section, we interpret these results in terms of empathy.
For men, contextual information is not important at all . On the contrary,
individual variables like the semester they are attending and the own origin are
significant.
Result 3: Contextual information influence female but not male proposers’
behavior.
Finally, the structure of the game definitely influences both male and female
oﬀers in the sense described above.
11We assume that being from Jena is a more precise piece of information that not being
from Jena. Students living in this city can represent in their mind a much more accurate
picture of people “from Jena” than of people loosely defined as “not from Jena”.
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Table 5
Ordinal probit regressions on proposers’ decisions
Both genders Male Female
Ind. variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Female -0.320 0.186* (Dropped) (Dropped)
YNG -0.997 0.194*** -1.159 0.288*** -0.965*** 0.276
Treatment 0.251 0.220 0.000 0.307 0.575* 0.322
Experience -0.065 0.028** -0.085 0.041** -0.069 0.044
City -0.447 0.304 -0.729 0.381* 0.529 0.603
City pairing -0.020 0.238 0.363 0.338 -0.689* 0.373
Female pairing 0.258 0.183 0.131 0.257 0.481* 0.271
Decision time 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.006 -0.006 0.007
Numb of obs 140 70 70
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.002 0.001
Significance levels: ∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.01 ∗∗ < 0.05 ∗ < 0.1
4.2.2 Responders’ behavior
When considering responders’ behavior we can only analyze the UG, since the
homogeneous pattern of acceptance in the YNG makes the responders’ behavior
in this game trivial. In contrast, responders’ behavior in the UG draws quite
interesting results (table 6). Regarding our two first hypotheses for responders,
and looking at the first model presented, we obtain the following results:
Result 4: The gender of the responder is not significantly correlated with the
size of the minimum acceptable oﬀer (MAO) in the UG.
Result 5: The gender of the proposer is not significantly correlated with the
size of the minimum acceptable oﬀer (MAO) in the UG.
14
Table 6
Ordered probit regressions on responders’ decisions
Both genders Male Female
Ind. variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Female -0.116 0.275 (Dropped) (Dropped)
Treatment 0.085 0.331 0.734 0.529 -0.280 0.498
Semester 0.063 0.045 0.033 0.061 0.109 0.082
City 0.024 0.382 -0.601 0.632 0.475 0.529
City pairing -0.800 0.466 -0.541 0.559 -8.250
Female pairing -0.236 0.264 -0.077 0.387 -0.306 0.405
Decision time 0.026 0.007*** 0.025 0.013* 0.023** 0.009
Numb of obs 80 40 40
Prob > chi2 0.010 0.182 0.021
Significance levels: ∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.01 ∗∗ < 0.05 ∗ < 0.1
Now we consider if contextual information matters for female or male re-
sponders. To do this, we focus on the second and third model presented. We
find that:
Result 6: Contextual information does not influence either male or female be-
havior in the UG.
Apart from the results we are interested in, we find an interesting correlation
between the time subjects take to make a decision and the decision itself. In
this case, the longer they take, the higher the MAO.12
From a methodological point of view, it is quite interesting to see how the
impact of knowing the partner’s gender on female responders’ behavior reported
in the previous subsection vanishes when controlling for other five variables.
Once we have tested our main hypotheses, and before discussing them, we
study gender diﬀerences in beliefs.
4.3 The analysis of beliefs
In the experiment, we elicited the probability attached by every proposer to
the acceptance of his or her oﬀer. The data show that there are no significant
12The relation between response time and decisions in the UG and the YNG is analyzed in
Brañas-Garza et al. (2007).
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gender diﬀerences in the proposers’ beliefs. Thus, even controlling for the size
of the oﬀer in the UG, women and men do not diﬀer significantly in what
they think about the probability of a given oﬀer being accepted (figure 1a).
Proposers’s beliefs in the YNG do not diﬀer significantly by gender either (figure
1b). However, although there are not quantitative diﬀerences in the probabilities
stated by women and men, we can observe how women are more aware of the
strategic advantage of the proposer in the YNG. This fact can be observed in
figure 1b, and comparing the average female stated probability of acceptance
(0.89) with the male one (0.85) in the YNG.
Figure 1a
Stated probability of acceptance in the UG
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Figure 1b
Stated probability of acceptance in the YNG
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On the responders’ side, we elicited the probabilities attached by every sub-
ject to every potential oﬀer. From these data, we compute the mean expected
oﬀer for every subject (figure 2). The analysis of responders’ beliefs give us ad-
ditional clues to interpret gender diﬀerences in experimental games. Whereas in
the UG there are no diﬀerences, i.e., female and male proposers expect on aver-
age the same amount of money, women anticipate better the proposer’s strategic
advantage in the YNG. In this game, women, on average, expect much less than
men (25.78 vs. 41.14). This diﬀerence is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney
U-test: z = 2.477, p = 0.013).
Figure 2
Expected oﬀer by game
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5 Interpreting the results: the role of empathy
In this section we provide a possible explanation for our main results: female but
not male proposers are aﬀected by contextual variables, and women are better
in anticipating others’ behavior in certain conditions. Specifically, we connect
our findings with the growing interest in cognitive neuropsychology to examine
the neural mechanisms underlying the human capacity to mentalize, i.e., the
ability to make attributions about the desires, beliefs, and intention of others.
This evidence can shed some light on diﬀerences between men and women in
simple experimental situations.
As Singer and Fehr (2005) have pointed out, ‘economist still know little
about what enables people to put themselves into other’s shoes and how this
ability interacts with their own preferences and beliefs.’ In our experiment, when
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strategic considerations are important, women are aﬀected by the social cues
(the partner’s gender and origin) contained in the environment. This fact might
be explained by the specific cognitive mechanisms that interact with women’s
social preferences. In fact, most of these cognitive processes are known to be
related to strategic decision making.
One of the most important social skills involved in predicting others’ be-
havior is empathy. Empathy allows one to quickly, and automatically relate to
the emotional state of others, which is something essential for the regulation of
social interaction toward shared goals (Preston and de Wall 2002). Two com-
ponents should be distinguished in empathy: the aﬀective component, i.e., the
ability to share the emotional experience of others; and the cognitive component
—‘cognitive empathy’—, i.e., the understanding of the others’ mental states (De-
cety and Jackson 2004). According to this latter dimension, empathy requires a
mental capacity: a social-cognitive ability to explain the behavior of others by
attributing to them independent mental states, such as belief, desires, emotions
or intentions (Decety and Jackson 2004; de Waal forthcoming; 1996; Gallagher
and Frith, 2003).
What is the connection between our results and empathy? Women but not
men are sensitive to the contextual information, namely the gender and the
origin of the partner. Understanding these data in terms of empathy leads us
to the importance of social closeness when empathizing. The more familiarity
and similarity with the object —e.g. being of the same specie, age or sex— the
more empathy experimented (de Vignemont and Singer 2006). This eﬀect is
in agreement with one result obtained in our experiment: women oﬀer more
when they know the partner’s gender and origin, and when they know that the
responder is another woman.
Familiarity and similarity have been already discussed by behavioral economists.
Physical similarity and social closeness have been studied in terms of social dis-
tance. Hoﬀman et al. (1996) argue that a decrease in social distance could in-
duce reciprocity. Bohnet and Frey (1999) allude to identification, not reciprocity
when explaining giving behavior in a dictator game. In contrast, Hoﬀman et
al. (1999) consider that these two results are compatible, since identification
and reciprocity are linked. Small and Loewenstein (2003) conclude that simply
indicating that there is a specific victim without providing any personal infor-
mation increases caring. But the evidence about the “identifiable victim eﬀect”
is mixed, and diﬀerent results depend on the specific form of the identification
mechanism (Güth et al. 2007).
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In our experiment, what results clearly show is how the contextual appraisal
is relevant for women in one particular situation. Female players use the given
information about their partner when they face a strategic decision. Women
playing as proposers process as much information as possible, because their
decision has to be aware of the responder’s veto power. In this scenario, knowing
more about the responder was valuable for them but not for men. In this
sense, we find support for the claim that when women have to make a decision
considering the behavior of others, cognitive mechanisms related to empathizing
and mentalizing processes are activated.
According to the empathizing-systemizing (E-S) theory of sex diﬀerences
(Baron-Cohen 2005), a stronger systemizing is present in males, i.e., the drive
to analyze a system in terms of the rules that governs the system in order to
predict the system. Empathizing is higher in females13 —because of the higher
interhemispheric connectivity—, which is the drive to identify the mental states
of others in order to predict and to respond to the behavior of another person
(Baron-Cohen et al. 2005).
Furthermore, neuroscientists have identified the relationship between sex
hemispheric lateralization and contextual appraisal. Cahill (2003) shows how
the right hemisphere amygdala modulates right hemispheric processing of cen-
tral aspects of a situation, while the left hemisphere amygdala modulates left
hemispheric processing of contextual details of a situation. The latter eﬀect is
more pronounced in females, whereas the former in males.
Our results, and the interpretation provided above, suggest that the mixed
results on gender diﬀerences in social preferences might be analyzed in terms
of diﬀerences in mentalizing and empathic capacities between the two sexes.
One main diﬀerence we have tested is the higher sensitiveness of women to
the information provided during the experiment. But further attention to both
abilities is needed to understand how men and women perceive social situations
when making strategic decisions.
13Many experiments underline how sex diﬀerences related to empathy and emotion regu-
lation processes —showing a female superiority— are partly biological in origin (Jackson and
Decety 2004; Seifritz et al.; 2003; Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004; Baron-Cohen et al.,
2005, de Vignemont and Singer 2006). Ickes (1997), on the contrary, stresses on motivational
factors. But this natural diﬀerence has been observed in the youngest infants (Lutchmaya and
Baron-Cohen 2002; Lutchmaya et al. 2002); and gender diﬀerences are even found in human
neonates (Conellan et al. 2001).
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6 Conclusion
This paper has studied the diﬀerences between men and women in social pref-
erences, in the context of two experimental bargaining games. Our results are
in line with several recent papers: we find no systematic quantitative gender
diﬀerences. Hence, instead of treating any behavioral gender diﬀerence as a
consequence of diﬀerences in female and male preferences, we concentrate on
how cognitive mechanisms impact women’s and men’s decision making. We
find that when women face a strategically relevant situation, they gather as
much contextual information as possible, while men are not aﬀected by this
information. In contrast, when information is strategically irrelevant, like in the
case of the responder in the UG and the YNG, both men and women behave
similarly.
We have connected our results with recent neuropsychological research on
female empathy. Women need information about the partner, “putting in the
other’s shoes”, to behave in a more sympathetic way. Thus, female proposers
in our experiment oﬀer higher amounts when they know precise information
about their partner. When they do not know this information they behave even
greedier than men. This interpretation of female proposers’ behavior might be
important for interpreting other experimental results, since we are suggesting
that information provided in the experimental context may aﬀect women and
men diﬀerently. This is an interesting hypothesis that deserves further attention,
but recent investigations in neuroscience and neuropsychology show that the
cognitive mechanisms behind empathy work quite diﬀerently in male and female
minds.
The analysis of participants’ beliefs about their partner’s behavior seems to
support our main conclusion. Under certain circumstances, women are better
in predicting others’ behavior than men. Thus, whereas we find no diﬀerences
in how women and men predict other’s behavior in the UG, we find interesting
diﬀerences in the YNG. Female proposers, on average, anticipate responder’s
behavior better than men, although this diﬀerence is not statistically signifi-
cant. Furthermore, we find a strong significant diﬀerence in the way male and
female responders’ predict proposers’ behavior. Women are much more aware
of the strategic advantage of the proposer in the YNG. The higher the level of
uncertainty is, the better women predict others’ behavior.
To conclude, we have to note that our results refer to strategic situations
where contextual information is provided. In this context, women use cues
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contained in the social environment to make decisions. If this is the case in
other contexts, it is an interesting line of enquiry for future research.
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Appendix A: Experimental instructions14
Game instructions
Both games
Welcome and thank you very much for participating in this experiment. Please
read the instructions carefully. If you have any questions or concerns, please
raise your hand. It is strictly forbidden to communicate with other participants
during the experiment. It is very important that you follow this rule. Otherwise
we must exclude you from the experiment and from all payments. Should you
have any question, please raise your hand and we will answer it individually.
During the experiment, we use ECU (Experimental Currency Unit) instead
of euro. At the end of the experiment, the ECU you have earned, will be
14This is a translation of the original German instructions. Note that the instructions for
the game phase were given in printed sheets, whereas the instructions for the belief elicitation
phase were only shown in the computer screen.
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converted to euro (10 ECU = 1C=) and the obtained amount will be paid to you
in cash.
In this experiment, two participants will interact with each other just once.
Each of the two members of a pair will be randomly assigned one of two roles:
X or Y. In the top right corner of the computer screen, you can read which role
(either X or Y) has being assigned to you and to your partner.
Each pair can share 100 ECU. X has the right to propose the distribution of
the 100 ECU. In particular, X chooses the distribution (x, y) meaning that X
wants to keep x ECU for him/herself, and to give y ECU to Y. More specifically,
X can choose any of the following 9 distributions:
x 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
y 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
Ultimatum game
Y must decide for each possible distribution of the 100 ECU, if he or she accepts
or rejects it. Thus, Y will face the following table:
x 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
y 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
Accept
Reject
For each possible distribution, Y must specify if he or she accepts or rejects
it by checking the corresponding box (thus Y is required to make 9 decisions).
After X and Y have made their choices, their payoﬀs are determined as
follows:
• If Y has accepted the actual proposal by X, then both get what X has
proposed, i.e., X earns x and Y earns y.
• If Y has rejected the actual proposal, then both earn nothing, i.e., the 100
ECU are lost.
Yes-or-No game
Without knowing which of the 9 possible proposals X has chosen, Y must
accept or reject it.
After X and Y have made their choices, their payoﬀs are determined as
follows:
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• If Y has accepted, then both get what X has proposed, i.e., X earns x and
Y earns y.
• If Y has rejected, then both earn nothing i.e., the 100 ECU are lost.
It must be emphasized that Y does not know the actual distribution (x,
y) proposed by X when deciding whether to accept or reject it.
Both games
At the end of the experiment, the actual payoﬀ will be paid out in cash, together
with the show-up fee of C=2.50 for having shown up on time.
Belief elicitation instructions
Belief elicitation procedure for responders
Now you will be given the opportunity to earn additional money by predicting
the choices of your partner. Please, answer the following question:
• On a scale from 0 to 100, how likely do you think it is that the other
member of your pair has chosen every of the following 9 distributions?
x 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
y 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
%
You must select for each distribution a number from 0 to 100. Moreover,
the sum of the numbers that you provide must be exactly 100.
For example, suppose that you think there is a 30% chance that your part-
ner has chosen distribution 10-90, a 25% chance that your partner has chosen
distribution 40-60 and a 45% chance that your partner has chosen distribution
50-50. In this case, you will enter 30 in the box under the 10-90 distribution
and 25 and 45 in the 40-60 and 50-50 distributions, respectively.
You will earn up to 20 ECUs for your predictions according to a specific
payoﬀ function that guarantees that the more accurate your prediction is the
more the ECUs you earn. This implies that the higher the probability stated
in the distribution your partner has chosen the higher your payoﬀ. And, vice
versa, the higher the probabilities stated in the other distributions, the lower
your payoﬀ. If you want to check this payoﬀ function please raise your hand
and we will show you privately.
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Note that since your prediction is made before you know what your partner
has actually chosen, the best thing you can do to maximize the expected side
of your prediction payoﬀ is simply state your true expectations about what you
think your partner has done. Any other prediction will decrease the amount
you can expect to earn as a prediction payoﬀ.
Note also that you cannot loose money from making predictions, you can
only earn more ECUs. The worst thing that could happen is that you predict
that your partner has chosen one particular action with 100% certainty but it
turns out that the he or she actually chose a diﬀerent action. In this case, you
will earn 0 ECUs. In all other situations, you will earn a strictly positive number
of ECUs.
Belief elicitation procedure for proposers
Now you will be given the opportunity to earn additional money by predicting
the choices of your partner. Please, answer the following question:
• On a scale from 0 to 100, how likely do you think it is that your partner
has accepted your oﬀer (the oﬀer in the YNG)?
Accepted
You must select a number from 0 to 100.
You will earn up to 20 ECUs for your predictions according to a specific
payoﬀ function that guarantees that the more accurate your prediction is the
more the ECUs you earn. If you want to check this payoﬀ function please raise
your hand and we will show it to you privately.
Note that since your prediction is made before you know what your partner
has actually has chosen, the best thing you can do to maximize the expected
side of your prediction payoﬀ is simply state your true expectations about what
you think your partner has done. Any other prediction will decrease the amount
you can expect to earn as a prediction payoﬀ.
Note also that you cannot loose money from making predictions, you can
only earn more ECUs.
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Appendix B: Belief elicitation procedures15
Belief elicitation procedure for responders
Let r = (r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9) indicated the reported beliefs of the re-
sponders. Remember that these are the responder’s belief that he or she will
receive every potential oﬀer (90, 80, 70, 60, 50, 40, 30, 20, 10). Since only one such
amount will actually be sent, the payoﬀ to player Y (the responder) when the
amount m is chosen will be:
Πm = 20.000−


(100− rm)
2
+
X
k 6=m
(rk)2



Note that this function says. A subject starts out with 20.000 points and
states a belief vector r = (r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9). If his or her partner
chooses to send the amount m, then the subject would be best oﬀ is he or she
had put all the probability weight on m. The fact that he or she assigned it
only rm means that he or she has made a mistake. To penalize this mistake we
subtract (100−rm)2 from the subject’s 20.000 endowment. Further, the subject
is also penalized for the amount he or she allocated to the other eight potential
oﬀers, by subtracting (rk)2 from his or her 20.000 points endowment as well.
The worst possible guess, i.e. putting all your probability mass on one potential
oﬀer to have your partner chooses another, yields a payoﬀ of 0. Telling the truth
is optimal.16
Belief elicitation procedure for the proposer
The proposer types only one probability (Πka), where k is the index of one of
the 9 potential oﬀers. This is the probability that the proposed oﬀer will be
accepted. In addition, let define (Πkr) as the complementary probability that
the oﬀer will be rejected. From this point on the payoﬀs are determined by a
quadratic scoring rule. The proposer’s prediction payoﬀ would be defined as
follows:
15The procedure and its description is directly adapted from Schotter and Sopher (2007).
16We use exactly the same scoring rule as Schotter and Sopher (2007). In order to calculate
our participants’ payoﬀs in ECUs, we divided the resulting amount by 1.000. Only 6 out of
280 participants asked to check the payoﬀ function. Therefore, we guarantee telling the truth
to participants (that the better their prediction, the higher their payoﬀ in the prediction task),
without asking them to perfectly understand the technical procedure.
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Πk = 20.000−
n¡
100−Πka
¢2
+ (Πkr)2
o
In other words, if the oﬀer was accepted but the proposer only predicted
that it would be accepted with probability Πka, the payoﬀ function penalizes
him or her by subtracting
¡
100−Πka
¢2
from his or her 20.000 point endowment.
It also subtracts (Πkr)2 since that is the probability predicting that the oﬀer will
be rejected which it was not. An analogous payoﬀ can be defined if the oﬀer
was rejected.
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